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I. Introduction
The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law
relating to oil and gas law from August 1, 2019 to July 31, 2020.
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
There has not been any significant Legislative or Regulatory
Developments affecting Kansas Oil and Gas Law from August 1, 2019, to
July 31, 2020.
III. Judicial Developments
A. Supreme Court Cases
1. Jason Oil Company, LLC v. Littler, et al.1
This was a quiet title action involving the mineral interests in two tracts
of land that were conveyed by two separate deeds in which the Grantor
excepted the mineral interests for a “period of 20 years or as long
thereafter” as minerals may be produced. The Supreme Court determined
that the common-law rule against perpetuities, being a rule founded on
public policy, should not be applicable here. This was a case of first
impression for the Kansas Supreme Court.
a) Facts and Procedural History
On December 30, 1967, Frank E. Littler (Grantor) executed two deeds
conveying two tracts of land situated in the same section in Rush County,
Kansas. Both deeds contained the following language:
“EXCEPT AND SUBJECT TO: Grantor saves and excepts all
oil, gas and other minerals in and under or that may be produced
from said land for a period of 20 years or as long thereafter as oil
and/or gas and/or other minerals may be produced therefrom and
thereunder.” (the reservation) 2
In 2016, Jason Oil Company, LLC (“Jason Oil”) filed a petition to quiet
title to both tracts claiming to hold valid oil and gas leases. The petition
alleged that the successors to the Grantees in both deeds owned all of the
minerals in and under each tract. The heirs of the Grantor answered,
claiming an interest in the mineral rights, arguing that after the deeds were
1. Jason Oil Co. v. Littler., 446 P.3d 1058 (Kan. 2019).
2. Id. at 1059.
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executed and delivered, Grantor was vested with a fee simple determinable
in the mineral rights and the Grantees to said deeds held springing
executory interests in the minerals which were subject to and invalidated by
the Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule). 3
Grantees’ heirs also answered. They admitted all of the allegations in
Jason Oil’s petition and cross-claimed against Grantor’s heirs alleging that
Grantees’ heirs owned the minerals. Grantees alternatively asserted that if
the Court determined the future interest in minerals conveyed by Grantor
violated the Rule, the interests should be reformed under the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) specifically under K.S.A. 593405(b) to conform with the intent of the parties and avoid violating the
Rule.4
The district court denied summary judgment to the Grantor’s heirs and
granted summary judgment to the Grantees’ heirs. The court noted that
there is no dispute that Grantor conveyed all of his interest in the subject
properties to the Grantees, subject only to the express reservation, excepting
and saving a term mineral interest. The court found that when construing
deeds, all other rules are subordinate to the intention of the Grantor and
Grantor’s intention in this case “could not be clearer than stated.” 5 The
court also found that Grantor’s reservation had not restricted alienation of
the surface and mineral estates of the real property in question. 6 The
Supreme Court granted the Grantor’s heirs’ motion to transfer the appeal
from the Court of Appeals.
From the expiration of the 20-year term, December 30, 1987, to the date
the district court filed its memorandum decision granting summary
judgment to the Grantees’ heirs, May 31, 2017, there was no drilling
operation conducted on either tract and no oil or gas or other minerals were
ever produced from either tract.7
b) Analysis
The Supreme Court was asked to decide a question of first impression in
Kansas that carries the potential of voiding innumerable transfers of mineral
interests and creating marketable title problems: Does the common practice
of reserving a term mineral interest in minerals that continues so long as

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id at 1060.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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minerals are produced create a springing executory interest that must be
invalidated by the Rule?8
The Supreme Court exercised unlimited review in making its decision.
With regards to the Rule, the Supreme Court agreed that the district court
was correct in holding that the Rule did not apply to Grantor’s excepted
interest, but for a different reason. The interest was not a reversion, but
rather it was a present, vested interest to which the Rule is simply
inapplicable.9 The future interest created by the deeds that the district court
should have focused on is the interest in the minerals that passed to the
Grantees. That interest is the right for Grantees to have full possession and
use of the mineral interest following the expiration of the Grantor’s
reserved defeasible term interest. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a
future interest would violate the Rule; but their task was to determine
whether the Rule should be applied to this type of future interest.10
The Court noted that no Kansas case has addressed whether to apply the
Rule to a grantee’s future interest in minerals following the grantor’s
reservation of a defeasible term mineral interest. Using the straightforward
language in the deeds at issue, the Court determined that the deeds created
in the Grantees a springing executory interest.11 The Court went on to
explain that if the Grantees’ heirs are to receive what the original parties to
the deed obviously intended the Grantees to have, it will be because this
Court carves out a narrow exception to the common-law rule against
perpetuities in Kansas, making the Rule inapplicable to a reserved (or
excepted) defeasible term mineral interest of the kind presented here. 12
The Court agreed with the Grantees that the application of the Rule in
this case would actually impede the alienability of the land because it would
result in the Grantor’s heirs holding the mineral interests in the real estate in
perpetuity.13 The Court agreed with other courts that have pointed out that
applying the Rule to prevent the reuniting of split mineral interests would
frustrate the policies behind the Rule. Here, applying the Rule would
increase the number of owners of the interest over time when the deed
provision actually provides for the reunification of the surface and mineral
interest.14
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
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c) Conclusion
The Supreme Court in this case held that the policies behind the Rule
include promoting the alienability of property. Applying the Rule in this
case would be counterproductive to the purpose behind the Rule and would
create chaos. The Court held that 1) the mineral interest reserved by the
Grantor was a defeasible term mineral interest; 2) that such interest is a
present interest rather than a future interest, and therefore the rule against
perpetuities did not apply; and 3) that Grantees’ future interest was a
springing executory interest. Finally, the Supreme Court here held that
where a grantor creates a defeasible term-plus-production mineral interest
by exception, leaving a future interest in an ascertainable grantee, the future
interest in minerals is not subject to the Rule. The Court held that the Rule
does not apply in this case, affirming the district court’s granting of
summary judgment to the Grantees’ heirs and ordering quiet title to the two
tracts.
2. Northern Natural Gas Company v. OneOK Field Services Company,
LLC, et al.15
In this case, a natural gas public utility sued gas buyers who had been
wrongfully converting gas that had migrated from the utility’s underground
injected-gas storage field. The Supreme Court reversed the judgement of
the district court granting summary judgment against Northern Natural Gas
Company (“Northern”), holding that certification from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) permitting Northern to expand the
authorized boundaries of its underground storage field to encompass nearby
wells changed the right-to-produce analysis for gas taken before June 2,
2010.
a) Facts and Procedural History
Northern Natural Gas Company injects into underground storage
reservoirs large quantities of previously produced natural gas acquired from
distant locations so it can remove, transport, and resell that gas later during
peak market conditions.16 In this case, some of its storage gas migrated
beneath the earth to nearby wells in areas Northern did not control through
eminent domain or contract. The wells’ operators extracted that gas and
sold it. A legal struggle ensued over the disputed right to produce
Northern’s migrated storage gas.
15. Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. OneOK Field Services Co., 448 P.3d 383 (Kan. 2019).
16. Id. at 386.
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In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court applied the common-law rule of
capture to rule that the operators lawfully produced and sold Northern’s
storage gas taken before June 2, 2010, the date when Northern received its
certificate from FERC.17 At issue in this appeal was whether the producers
could take Northern’s migrated storage gas from wells located within the
newly certified boundaries from the storage field after June 2, 2010. The
district court ruled on summary judgment that the producers had that right
under the common-law rule of capture.18 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that once the new boundaries were certified, Northern’s identifiable
storage gas within that designated area was no longer subject to the rule of
capture.19
b) Analysis
There were no material facts in dispute as to the issue on appeal, so the
Supreme Court exercised de novo review as to the legal effect of
undisputed facts. The legal question here is how the common-law rule of
capture operates during the time between certificate issuance and storage
rights acquisition.20
The Court relied on Union Gas System, Inc. v. Carnahan, 245 Kan. 80
(Kan. 1989), which is part of the body of Kansas capture-law in the unique
context of migrated storage gas.21 This case held the gap-filling rule
permitting others to capture and keep an injector’s gas, as developed in case
law, does not apply after a natural gas public utility obtains certificated
authority to use a storage area and its gas within that area is identifiable. 22
The Court held that the Union Gas exception to the common-law capture
rule should continue.
c) Conclusion
The Supreme Court in this case held that 1) landowners and producers
did not retain right to capture utility’s gas after date of FERC certificate;
and 2) cessation of right to capture the gas was not a taking. The Court
reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment
holding that the court erred when it granted judgment against Northern.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 400.
Id.
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B. Appellate Activity
1. Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Com’n23
In Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Com’n, the Court of Appeals of
Kansas addressed, in part, whether the Kansas Corporation Commission
(the “Commission”) improperly applied the Kansas Unitization Act in
denying an application by the Lario Oil & Gas Company (“Lario”) to
unitize several oil and gas leases on the same set of geological formations
for the purpose of operating them as a single unit when the Commission’s
decision was based on the ground that the formations did not constitute a
single pressure system. 24
a) Facts and Proceedings
Lario applied for unitization and unit operations for the Feiertag Unit “to
enhance the ultimate recovery of liquid hydrocarbons” from several wells it
owns and operates the working interest in within Shawnee, Lansing, Kansas
City, Marmaton, Cherokee, Morrow, Basel Penn, and Mississippian
formations in said unit within Scott County. 25
Lario sought to operate a reservoir described as “the interval between the
top of the unitized substances in the Topeka Formation at 3,570 feet
through the Oread, Lansing-Kansas City Marmaton, Millrich, Morrow and
St. Louis formations at 4,700 feet.”26 Lario argued said unitization was
“economically feasible and reasonably necessary to prevent waste within
the reservoir and thereby increasing substantially the ultimate recovery of
oil and gas,” estimating the value of additional recovery of oil and gas
substantially exceeded the estimated additional costs of conducting the
unitized operations. 27 Lario noted that 92.64 percent of the working interest
holders and 95.53 percent of the royalty owners had approved said
unitization.28
Cholla Production, LLC (“Cholla”) is one interest holder who did not
approve of the unitization, who filed a protest to Lario’s application, and
asked to intervene. 29 Cholla, being an oil and gas exploration company who
owned and operated oil and gas producing properties both within and next
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Com’n, 450 P.3d 353 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to Lario’s proposed unit boundary, alleged that Lario’s proposed plan
would cut through Cholla’s contiguous producing acreage and would take
over two of Cholla’s wells. 30 It further alleged that Lario’s proposed plan
did not meet the requirements of K.S.A. 55-1304 because: (1) the plan was
flawed geologically; (2) the allocations to property owners were unfair and
unequitable; (3) the plan would substantially and irreparably harm Cholla’s
correlative rights; (4) the plan would cause waste in violation of K.S.A. 55601; and (5) the plan would unduly violate Cholla’s property rights contrary
to the Kansas and United States Constitution. 31
Lario did not object to Cholla’s intervention, but denied its allegations.
The Commission allowed Cholla to intervene. 32
In its order denying Lario’s application to unitize, the Commission
stressed three points: (1) it could approve Lario’s request for unitization
only upon a showing that the unit constituted a single-pressure system and
the unit would contribute to the prevention of waste and the protection of
correlative rights; (2) Lario had not met its burden to show that its proposed
unit constituted a single-pressure system, largely due to the varied bottomhole pressures shown across the wells; and (3) that Lario’s apparent
suggestion that it could artificially cure “the problem” by trying to perforate
all the formations to create a single-pressure system would constitute waste
in violation of the Kansas Unitization Act. 33
Lario sought judicial review of the Commission’s denial of its
application. The district court, 25th Judicial District, affirmed the
Commission’s denial of Lario’s application for unitization. Lario appealed
the district court’s decision to the Court of Appeals Kansas, in part, on the
ground that the Commission misinterpreted the Kansas Unitization Act by
using a too narrow definition of the term “pool,” which improperly
increased what it had to prove in order to show that the leases can be
operated as a common unit.34
For the purposes of this update, we will only be reporting on the first
ground stated above.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 356.
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b) Rules of Law
The Kansas Unitization Act, K.S.A. 55-1301 et seq., gives the Kansas
Corporation Commission the jurisdiction to regulate and permit the
grouping of oil and gas leases into a single unit production unit. 35
The legislative purpose of the Kansas Unitization Act is to prevent
waste, to further the conservation of oil and gas, and to protect the
correlative rights of persons entitled to share in the production of oil and
gas.36
There are four factors which the Commission must consider before it can
order unit operations. Under K.S.A. 55-1304, the Commission must look at
production, feasibility, costs and fairness to all:
(a)(1) The primary production from a pool or part thereof sought
to be unitized has reached a low economic level and, without
introduction of artificial energy, abandonment of oil or gas wells
is imminent; or (2) the unitized management, operation, and
further development of the pool or the part thereof sought to be
unitized is economically feasible and reasonably necessary to
prevent waste within the reservoir and thereby increase
substantially the ultimate recovery of oil or gas;
(b) the value of the estimated additional recovery of oil and gas
substantially exceeds the estimated additional cost incident to
conducting such operations; and
(c) the proposed operation is fair and equitable to all interest
owners.37
“Waste” is defined under K.S.A.55-1302(d) as being “both economic
and physical waste resulting from the development and operation separately
of tracts that can best be operated as a unit.”38
A “pool” is defined under K.S.A. 55-1302(b) as being “an underground
accumulation of oil and gas in one or more natural reservoirs in
communication so as to constitute a single pressure system so that
production from one part of the pool affects the pressure throughout its
extent.”39
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357 (quoting in part, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-1302(d) (2020)).
Id. (quoting in part, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-1302(b) (2020)).
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c) Discussion
Lario raised the following notable issues on appeal:
(1) that the Commission misinterpreted the Kansas Unitization Act by
requiring a “full” or “total”, or even a particular degree or extent of pressure
communication;
(2) that the Commission erroneously conflated the two distinct pathways
to unitization under the Kansas Unitization Act by not recognizing a
different standard for pressure communication for pools that are near the
end of their economic life under K.S.A. 55-1304(a)(1) than the standard for
pools that are not near the end of their economic life under K.S.A. 551304(a)(2). and that the Commission’s order erroneously conflated these
two distinct pathways to unitization and rendered entire portions of the
Kansas Unitization Act meaningless.40
(1) The Commission did not misinterpret the Kansas Unitization Act to
require “full” or “total” pressure communication
Lario argued that K.S.A. 55-1302(b) does not require “full” or “total”, or
even a particular degree or extent of pressure communication, and that
Lario had provided sufficient evidence of pressure communication
throughout the extent of the proposed unit. 41 Lario alleged the use of such a
restrictive test creates physical and economic waste rather than preventing
it, and would have a chilling effect on future applications for unitization
thereby causing more waste. 42
The Court of Appeals did not find Lario’s argument to be supported by
the record, noting the Commission did not use the terms “full” or “total” in
their order, and that the Commission simply required Lario to show that its
proposed unit constituted a single-pressure system. 43
(2) The Commission did not erroneously conflate the two distinct
pathways to unitization
Lario argued that the Commission erroneously conflated the two distinct
pathways to unitization under the Kansas Unitization Act by not
recognizing a different standard for pressure communication for pools that
are near the end of their economic life under K.S.A. 55-1304(a)(1) than the
standard for pools that are not near the end of their economic life under
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 363.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 361-362.
Id. at 362.
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K.S.A. 55-1304(a)(2), thereby rendering entire portions of the Kansas
Unitization Act meaningless.44
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that Lario’s argument
was “a distinction without a difference”, and stated that nothing in the law
requires a different standard to be applied for the two pathways to
unitization.45 All units, regardless of their economic condition, must be
single-pressure systems according to K.S.A. 55-1302(b).46
d) Conclusion
The Court of Appeals held the Commission properly interpreted and
applied the Kansas Unitization Act in denying Lario’s application, and the
district court did not err in affirming the Commission’s ruling. The
judgment of the district court was affirmed. 47
C. Trial Activity
No relevant trial activity was reported during the survey period.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
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